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One of the most interesting things to emerge recently (by which I 
mean over the past 5 years) relates to the treatment of uncertainty. 
The extent of shared statistical underpinnings across ostensibly very 
different subject areas often comes as a surprise to outsiders. 
For all their individual idiosyncrasies, much econometrics would be 
instantly recognisable to an engineer. Indeed, the concept of signal 
extraction from noisy data has been directly lifted from engineering. 
Likewise, the similarities between the kinds of time-series analysis 
widely used in finance and economics and much spatial modelling in 
geography are undeniable. Epidemiological modelling, incidentally, 
operates within the same paradigm. 
Yet perhaps this isn’t as surprising as it should seem. The 
probabilistic underpinnings do not vary, being governed by laws that 
follow inexorably from the axioms of probability. Much of this is 
common sense (on a fair die you have the same chance of rolling a 
six as rolling a one), but a great deal is not. 
An (in)famous example, is the case of Sally Clark, in which the so-
called “prosecutor’s fallacy” led to the wrongful conviction of an 
innocent woman in the late 1990s. In this case, an expert witness and 
numerous legal professionals – all highly intelligent people – failed to 
properly apply Bayes’ rule and a miscarriage of justice was the result. 
Two other (linked) mistakes that occur frequently are to assign 
excessive weight to point estimates (e.g. “Brexit will cause a 3.4% 
decline in GDP by 2030”) and to assume that because estimates 
disagree dramatically they are worthless. The former is often done by 
the media (who will tend to take a number that agrees with their 
preconceptions or those of their audience). Yet go to the original 
research and the results are usually heavily caveated and contain a 
confidence interval (e.g. “between 2.2% and 4.6% of GDP). 
Even this understates the level of uncertainty inherent in such 
analyses and academics are complicit here. After all, we love to 
believe that we are “correct”, that our model of the world captures the 
“truth”. In reality, the level of uncertainty is much greater than that 
suggested by our results because of model uncertainty – what if our 
underlying assumptions are wrong? 
There are ways of dealing with this uncertainty – Bayesian model 
averaging being a key method – although this tends to sit uneasily 
with many who are wedded to Popper’s “hypothetical-deductive” 
approach and grounded in frequentist statistics. We typically 
compound our errors by failing to appreciate that in the real world, 
probability distributions are sometimes skewed in one direction and 
typically are surprisingly “fat-tailed” (outcomes far from the average 
are much more likely than we assume) – leptokurtic for those who like 
complicated words! 
So what does this mean for how we treat uncertainty back in the real 
world? We can’t rule out extreme outcomes and we need to be better 
prepared for “extreme” eventualities. Take pandemics, for example. 
In all probability, this will not be the last pandemic during my lifetime, 
although I sincerely hope that it is. Why do I make such a statement? 
After all, history would suggest these are once-in-a-century events: 
the last deadly pandemic was the (misnamed!) Spanish flu. 
Unfortunately, much in the same way that severe flooding appears to 
be increasing frequency, we cannot be sanguine that historical norms 
will continue to apply. We’ve had a worrying number of near-misses in 
recent years and they appear to be getting more common. Even I (not 
an expert in the field) can name several in recent years – SARS, 
MERS and “swine flu” – not to mention the emergence of several 
other deadly diseases which spread less easily (HIV and Ebola being 
obvious examples). How do we change our behaviour if we treat the 
emergence of a virulent pathogen as a one-in-twenty event rather 
than a one-in-one-hundred one? 
Of course, while they’re at the forefront of everybody’s minds right 
now, pandemics are hardly the only challenge we face over the 
coming decades. Two that are readily identifiable (and hence can be 
mitigated) are antibiotic resistance and climate change. In both cases, 
the mitigation strategies are obvious in theory but challenging to 
pursue in practice. 
Both represent problems of coordination relating to what the 
economics profession terms “externalities”. When I drive a car, much 
of the “cost” is borne by other people. If the greenhouse gases 
emitted by my exhaust change the climate such that drought is more 
likely to afflict Sudan or flooding is more likely in Bangladesh, the cost 
is borne by the people living there, not me. 
Similarly, if the fumes from my exhaust cause lung damage to people 
living in central Birmingham as I drive past, they bear most of the cost 
of that (through ill-health and shorter lifespans), not me. Of course, I 
bear (some of) the cost of other peoples’ exhaust fumes. Theoretically 
we could all come to an agreement to drive less and everyone would 
be better off (I’d be inconvenienced by not driving but that would be 
more than compensated for by better health due to fewer exhaust 
fumes). 
Sadly, the costs of bargaining (and enforcement!) preclude coming to 
an efficient outcome, an insight attributable to the renowned 
economist Ronald Coase[1]. Much the same is true of antibiotic 
resistance: the cost of abuse (taking antibiotics unnecessarily) to me 
is close-to-zero but the cost to the world is high. 
In all cases, the outcomes are highly uncertain. We don’t know their 
precise impact. However, since extreme outcomes are so devastating 
and we cannot rule them out, the lesson is that we need to take quite 
strong actions to minimise their probability of occurrence. 
In an ideal world, that involves close co-operation across the whole 
species. Unfortunately, that’s unlikely. We can, however, act 
unilaterally. That means appropriately taxing carbon domestically and 
on imports in terms of climate change. It also means rapid investment 
in renewables, potentially including elsewhere in the world as an act 
of altruism. 
We can dramatically increase research funding into new antibiotics 
and eliminate their unnecessary use domestically. We can keep 
residual manufacturing and engineering capacity even when it is 
“uneconomic” to do so in order to render a large scale-up feasible if 
needed (and a pandemic is just one example of this). Over-
provisioning is a waste of resources in normal times, but can be 
worthwhile as an insurance policy in case of catastrophic outcomes. 
The lesson of recent years is this: expect disruption and change. They 
are the new normal. 
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